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Hegel on Sovereignty and Monarchy 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
Abstract 
Hegel is not a democrat.  He is a monarchist.  But he wants monarchy because 
he does not want strong government.  He wants to deemphasize power.  He 
develops an idealist conception of sovereignty that allows for a monarch less 
powerful than a president—one whose task is to expresses the unity of the 
state and realize the rationality inherent in it.  A monarch needs to be a 
conduit through which reason is expressed and actualized, not a power that 
might obstruct this process.   
 
I. 
It must be admitted that Hegel is not much of a democrat.  He relegates democracy 
to a past stage in the historical development of the state and considers it superficial 
to view democracy as something that could be an object of choice in the modern 
world.1  Hegel is committed to hereditary monarchy—not even to elected 
monarchy.2  Moreover, his monarch has sole responsibility for the command of a 
standing army, not a citizen militia—which is what democrats would tend to favor.3  
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Furthermore, citizens do not even directly elect representatives to the 
legislature.4  Membership in the upper house is hereditary;5 and representatives to 
the lower house are elected through corporations.6  Moreover, Hegel does not 
believe in universal suffrage.  For him, “It goes without saying that day laborers, 
servants, etc., are [not allowed to vote, but] are excluded as not being members of” a 
corporation.7   
He also believes in financial qualifications for holding positions of authority 
within corporations.8  There are also property qualifications for membership in the 
Estates Assembly, at least for those who enjoy a hereditary seat in the upper 
house—they must be wealthy landowners.9  Representatives to the lower house, for 
Hegel, are “elected without regard to property qualifications.…”  And they are 
elected though corporations “from which no actual citizen … is excluded, regardless 
of means.”  But day laborers and servants, we have just seen, are not allowed into 
corporations.  And Hegel thinks most of those elected to the lower house will have 
already held other government posts for which there would have been property 
qualifications.10   
Generally speaking, for Hegel, one of the main functions of the legislature is to 
give citizens a chance to express themselves and for them to be educated.11  But they 
basically lack insight and should be kept away from important matters.12  And what 
must definitely be avoided is opposition between the legislature and the executive.13  
Certainly, the legislature should not have power over the state.14 
Moreover, Hegel’s attitude toward public opinion and free speech is not what 
one would hope.  He realizes that it can be dangerous to deny freedom of speech and 
 3 
he admits that in the modern world “each individual wishes to be consulted and to 
be given a hearing.”15  Moreover, he thinks this is acceptable, given a stable 
government, basically because it is innocuous.16  In general, his view of public 
opinion is that it contains as much truth as error and is to be respected as much as it 
is to be despised.17  It requires a “great man to discover the truth within it …” and to 
tell the age “what its will is.…”18 
While Hegel is not much of a democrat, nevertheless, it cannot be said that he is 
an authoritarian, and he is certainly not the totalitarian Popper thinks he is.19  Hegel 
wants governance “from below.”  He rejects control “from above,” certainly of the 
sort “introduced by the French Revolution and further developed by Napoleon.…”  
He wants universal and particular interests to come together and he thinks this is 
only possible if the masses are organized as a power and cease to be merely a 
collection of scattered atoms.20 
Such governance “from below” may not seem to fit with the fact that Hegel wants 
a monarch, but Hegel certainly does not want anything like an absolute monarch of 
the sort that was overthrown in the French Revolution.  At the same time, and just 
as much, he does not want a legislative power that could engulf the executive, as he 
thinks also happened at times during the French Revolution.21  Thus, while it may 
strike us as odd, Hegel wants a monarch because he does not want strong 




By a sovereign, one generally means the single highest power and legitimate 
authority in the state—that is certainly what Hobbes meant.22  This is not, however, 
what Hegel means by a sovereign.  He wants to deemphasize power, certainly the 
power of the government, but also the power of the people.  And, after all, if you 
understand sovereignty in terms of power, it has to occur to you that the people can 
be very powerful, and thus that claims to sovereignty could possibly be made on 
their behalf.  Hegel wants to avoid that. 
Hegel does agree that there must be a final highest authority.  Lacking any other, 
he even holds that “the ultimate decision on major issues and important concerns … 
of the state” was decided by oracles, entrails, and bird flight in the ancient world.23  
In a modern rational state, this of course would be unacceptable.  There “the 
ultimate formal decision is for the monarch” to make.  “He has to say, ‘I so will 
it.…’”24  The monarch must be sovereign.   
In feudal times, Hegel thinks, the monarch was not sovereign.  The state was a 
loose aggregate rather than a unity; offices were the private property of individuals; 
and their obligations to the whole were left to their own whim.25  In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel spoke of a haughty vassal, willing to give council and 
advice, but not willing to actually serve and obey the monarch.26  In The German 
Constitution, Hegel made it clear that the haughty vassal was especially a problem in 
Germany—and stood in the way of its development as a modern state.27  Germany 
was nothing but the “sum of the rights which the individual parts [had] extracted 
from the whole … to ensure that no power [remained] in the hands of the state.…”28  
Hegel is very concerned that Germany shed the last vestiges of feudalism and 
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become a modern state.  While he does not want the sort of absolute monarch that 
in the Phenomenology finally subordinated the haughty vassal, he does want a real 
highest authority—a real sovereign.  He just thinks it is a mistake to identify 
sovereignty with mere power and thus arbitrariness.29     
Hegel also thinks the people cannot be sovereign because, without the unity the 
monarch gives the whole, the people would be a formless mass incapable of even 
being a state, let alone a sovereign.30  Sovereignty requires more than an 
aggregation; it requires organic unity.  Particular functions and powers of the state 
cannot be understood as separable parts—they must be understood as being 
members of an organism, that is, they cannot be separated from the whole without 
destruction—as a heart severed from the body is no longer really a heart.31  Hegel 
says, “The nature of the organism is such that unless all of its parts become an 
identity—if any one of them posits itself as self-sufficient—all must perish.”32  
Sovereignty, Hegel says, is the “ideality of the particular spheres and functions 
[within the state],” that is, that these are “not independent or self-sufficient” but are 
“determined by and dependent on the end of the whole….”33  A modern state 
requires such unity.  It is incompatible with the people as a formless aggregate or 
with haughty vassals fragmenting the state into their own separate spheres of 
particular rights.34     
Hegel is an idealist and he takes the state to be ideal, that is, he takes it to be a 
complex web of ideas, beliefs, values, commitments, loyalties, practices, procedures, 
offices, institutions, laws, duties, rights, and so forth.  It is a complex web of 
concepts.35  To say that the sovereign is ideal is to say that it brings this complex 
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web, the ideality of the state, into unity—and it expresses that unity.  This is to say 
that the sovereign is not merely a powerful entity outside and above the rest of the 
state, something that merely directs or controls the state.  The sovereign is the state.  
Hegel is an idealist.  The sovereign is the unity of the state.36  Any part of the state 
(an office, a court, a legislative body, certainly a haughty vassal, even the people) 
that was somehow separated from this unity would cease to be what it is—it could 
not exist apart from this unity.  All the parts of the state are brought into this unity 
by and expressed through the sovereign. 
Moreover, for Hegel, this unity must be the self-conscious unity of a person that 
can culminate in an “I will.”  What is required is an individual leader.37  In the 
Philosophy of Right and in the Introduction to the Philosophy of World History, Hegel 
speaks of world historical individuals.  The greatness of such people, he thinks, 
consists in the fact that they give expression to the next step in the development of 
world spirit.38  They “translate the will of the national spirit into reality.… 
Individuals fade into insignificance beside the universal substance….”39  In the same 
way, the monarch as an individual is insignificant.  The monarch’s particular 
character is of no importance, “it is only a question of the highest instance of formal 
decision, and all that is required in a monarch is someone to say ‘yes’ and to dot the 
‘i.’”40  Just as the world historical individual is unimportant except as the channel 
through which world spirit expresses itself, so the monarch is unimportant except 
as the channel through which the nation comes into a unity and expresses itself.  
What might otherwise be seen as an aggregate collection of practices, procedures, 
offices, and processes that make up the state comes into an ideal unity that is 
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expressed and actualized in the sovereign’s “I will.”  It is the rational organization of 
the state that makes the person of the regent insignificant.41  But while the person is 
insignificant, the “I will” of the sovereign is quite significant—and it is incompatible 
with haughty vassals or the people as a formless aggregate that think themselves 
outside the unity of this sovereign “I will.”  
Hegel develops his idealist conception of sovereignty as monarchy, not because 
he wants strong government, but for pretty much the opposite reason.  This can be 
seen if we contrast Hegel’s concept of sovereignty to that of Hobbes.  For Hobbes, I 
have argued elsewhere, the only thing holding the state together is the power of the 
sovereign.  If the sovereign’s power were to weaken, the subjects would risk return 
to the state of nature—a war of each against all.  It is as if the sovereign alone holds 
together a handful of marbles—if the sovereign were to lose its grip, the marbles 
would bounce in all directions.  This is to say, in effect, that Hobbes has no social 
theory, only a political theory.  He has no theory to explain the coherence of 
individuals in society apart from political power.  For Locke, property and property 
interest explain such coherence.  For Marx, class and class interest do so.  For the 
ancients, custom and tradition did so.  Lacking any theory of this sort, the only 
power that can hold the state together, for Hobbes, is the political power of the 
sovereign—and thus this power must be absolute.  It follows that the more 
coherence one finds at the social level, the less power one need concede to the 
sovereign.  Thus, Locke can argue for limited sovereignty and Marx can even argue 
for the withering away of the state.42 
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Hegel has a sophisticated social theory.  Moreover, it is not just a Lockean theory 
of property and property interest, but a theory of civil society in which, as for Smith 
and Ricardo, conflicting particular interests work to promote and reinforce the 
universal.  Civil society provides the state with a rational and stable organization 
such that a powerful sovereign is not needed and the monarch can be insignificant.43  
The practices, procedures, and processes that make up the state can come into an 
ideal unity that needs only be publicly expressed in the sovereign’s “I will.”44   
 
III. 
Still, while we may accept that any state needs a final highest authority, why, we 
might ask, must it be a monarch?  A significant part of the answer might seem to be 
that Hegel was simply unable, or unwilling, to “overleap his own time or leap over 
Rhodes.”45  He takes his task to be the comprehension of what is actual, and it is 
monarchy that is actual in the Germany of his era.  It will not be a few decades later 
for Marx, but it is in 1821.  I do not wish to suggest that Hegel is just trapped in his 
era.  After all, he is very much opposed to an absolute monarch of the sort that had 
recently been removed in France and he wants to bring about a modern, rational, 
constitutional monarch that in 1821 did not yet exist in Germany. 
Still, our tendency is to want to ask:  why not a president?  Wouldn’t a president 
be superior to a monarch?  While I definitely would not want to replace presidents 
with monarchs, and while I do not in any way want to be taken to be monarchist, 
nevertheless, I do not think Hegel is simply caught in his own era and I think he has 
some very thoughtful reasons for preferring monarchy.46  
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Our instinct is to object to monarchy because we think monarchs too powerful.  
Far better to have a president that is answerable to, and thus limited by, an 
electorate.  Hegel’s response, I think, would be that a president is far too powerful.47  
While the President of the United States is not sovereign, the people are, 
nevertheless, our President is much more powerful than Hegel’s sovereign.  Hegel’s 
monarch is marked by its insignificance.  All it does is “say ‘yes’ and … dot the ‘i.’”48  
A president does a very great deal more than that.  
Hegel even rejects an elected monarch.  In part, no doubt, this stems from his 
opposition to democracy, but it also stems from his opposition to the power, and the 
type of power, elections give to the electors as well as to the elected.  Hegel says that 
elective monarchy: 
 
is the worst of institutions.… In an elective monarchy … the nature of the relation 
that holds between king and people implies that the ultimate decision is left with 
the particular will … i.e., a surrender of the state’s might at the discretion of the 
particular will.  The result of this is that the particular powers of the state are 
transformed into private property, the sovereignty of the state is weakened and 
lost, and finally the state disintegrates within.… 49    
 
Hegel’s suggestion that elective monarchy transforms state powers into private 
property is part of his hostility to feudalism.  Wood points out that in Hegel’s era 
elective monarchy “was associated with the institution of the Holy Roman Emperor, 
who was chosen by a college of six electors.…”50  Rights, in the feudal system, were 
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“not a matter of principle, i.e. of rationality and absolute right.  On the contrary, they 
appear there as single acquisitions, due to the favour of special circumstances and 
restricted to this or that conjuncture of events.…”51  Thus the “German political 
edifice is nothing other than the sum of the rights which the individual parts have 
extracted from the whole.…”52  This meant that the functions and powers of the state 
were invested in a mere aggregate of independent parts and were in effect the 
“private property of individuals.”53  
But Hegel is also opposed to election by the people, which also emphasizes the 
importance of interests and bases itself on particular will.  These interests, for Hegel, 
legitimately assert themselves in civil society, but if they assert themselves at the 
level of the state, they threaten to turn the powers of the state into private 
property.54  And certainly the influence of big money in elections is something that 
many find increasingly threatening in the United States today.  An elected president 
dependent upon the support of interest groups is going to be a more powerful force 
than what Hegel wants for his monarch, that is, an idealized unity of the state 
responsible merely for saying ‘yes’ and dotting the ‘i.’     
However, one might not want to agree with my portrait of a Hegelian sovereign 
weaker than a president.  Hegel, after all, claims that his sovereign cannot be held 
answerable for its actions.55  But to understand this correctly, we must recognize 
that Hegel distinguishes the executive from the monarch.56  For Hegel, the executive 
is very definitely answerable; only the monarch is not.57  Still, one might think that if 
the monarch is not answerable, then, after all, it is extremely powerful.   But Hegel is 
quite clear that the monarch “is bound by the concrete content of the advice he 
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receives” from the ministers, such that “he often has nothing more to do than sign 
his name.”58  Thus,  
 
the monarch is completely dependent with respect to the particular content, he 
knows it not by himself, he can decide only in accordance with the 
representation that is given him of the matter at hand and of the relevant laws; 
he decides in accordance with this representation.59   
 
Moreover, the monarch’s “every decision must be signed by the competent 
minister.”60  It is true that the monarch chooses the ministers and is free to depose 
them at will, but that does not mean that the monarch can simply dominate them—
because the ministers are also answerable to parliament.61  Moreover, the monarch 
does not control the assets of the state, but has an “income only in the form of the 
household funds allowed to him.”62 
On the other hand, though, Hegel says that the sovereign “has direct and sole 
responsibility for the command of the armed forces, for the conduct of relations 
with other states through ambassadors etc., and for making war and peace and 
concluding treaties of other kinds.”63  This would seem to grant the monarch a great 
deal of power, far more than the President of the United States, who, at least in 
theory, if not in fact, cannot declare war unilaterally.  Brooks argues that there is an 
inconsistency here:  Hegel’s claim that all the monarch need do is to “say ‘yes’ and … 
dot the ‘i’”64 is not consistent with his claim that the monarch commands the armed 
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forces and has sole responsibility for making war.65  In general, Brooks thinks that 
Hegel’s monarch “is far more powerful than commonly recognized.”66 
 It is not clear, however, that Brooks is correct.  He seems to assume that Hegel’s 
real commitment is to a monarch that commands the military and has sole 
responsibility for making war, that this is to be understood in the traditional sense, 
and that therefore Hegel is not really committed to a monarch that is insignificant 
and only need “say ‘yes’ and … dot the ‘i.’”   
But we need not make these assumptions.  It is quite possible to go the other 
way, to take Hegel at his word, to think that his real commitment (repeated several 
times) is to an insignificant monarch that only need “say ‘yes’ and … dot the ‘I,’” and 
that this too is the way we should understand the monarch’s “sole responsibility for 
the command of the armed forces … and for making war.”  In other words, that what 
is needed here too is simply the sovereign’s “I will”—that in the declaration of war, 
the sovereign again has “nothing more to do than to sign his name.”67  It is true that 
the sovereign can fire ministers that do not give the sovereign what the sovereign 
wants to sign, but those ministers are also answerable to the parliament and the 
monarch does not control finances, without which the monarch could hardly fight a 
war.68        
To understand why Hegel favors monarchy, we might look back to his treatment 
in the Phenomenology of the rise of absolute monarchy.  There we saw that the move 
beyond feudalism and a haughty vassal not willing to serve and obey the monarch, 
the move toward a modern centralized and unified state, at least in France, required 
an absolute monarch.69   
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The problem began earlier in the Phenomenology, in the section entitled 
“Lordship and Bondage,” where we found a master whose only source of recognition 
was from a slave.  We saw that the master could not get adequate recognition from a 
mere slave.  The slave was a nobody—a nothing.  Moreover, it was the master who 
made the slave a nothing.  We saw that the recognition that can be gotten from a 
nothing ultimately amounts to nothing.   
As the Phenomenology proceeded, I have argued elsewhere, we came to see that 
the more important the recognizer, the more significant the recognized.  A Noble 
that serves the greatest of monarchs would end up gaining far more in importance 
and significance than would a Noble that serves the insignificant regent of a third-
rate backwater.  Recognition from a nobody amounts to nothing.  The institutions 
from which we get recognition need to be raised above ourselves.70   
But what, then, about the Philosophy of Right?  There, Hegel does not want an 
absolute monarch.  He wants a constitutional monarch—and one that is weaker 
than a president.  He wants an insignificant monarch that need only dot the ‘i.’  It 
might seem to follow from my theory of recognition that the subjects of such a 
monarch would be the losers, that they would end up with much less recognition 
and thus much less significance and reality.  That, however, would be a mistake.  In 
fact, Hegel would think that the subjects of such a monarch would end up with 
higher recognition and thus greater significance and reality.  What is important 
about monarchy, again, is not power, but rationality and ideality.  If the state has 
become rational, if rationality permeates the ideality of the state, then you do not 
 14 
want a power that could get in the way of this rationality, you want a conduit that 
simply expresses it, that signs its name, and says “I will.”  
The ideality of the state means that the particular functions and powers of the 
state are not independent or self-sufficient, but are dependent upon and determined 
by the whole and it ends.71  The state is a complex web of ideas, values, laws, rights, 
procedures, offices, and authorities.  To say that the sovereign is ideal is to say that 
it brings this complex web, the ideality of the state, into unity and it expresses that 
unity.  The sovereign is that unity.  As Hegel puts it,   
 
In the organization of the state (which in this case means constitutional 
monarchy), the one thing which we must bear in mind is the internal necessity of 
the Idea.… The state must be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a 
hieroglyph of reason which becomes manifest in actuality.72 
 
What we need in a monarch is a hieroglyph, a symbol, an ideality through which 
reason is expressed and actualized, not a power that might obstruct this process.  If 
we can recognize reason embedded in the state, in its laws and institutions, in its 
history and constitution, then, in so far as the state is rational, it is not something 
rational citizens can reject.  In so far as it is rational, it stands as an authority over 
us—a legitimate and objective authority.  From a modern rational state that is 
objectively right, we can get higher, more significant, and more valuable recognition 
than we can get from an absolute monarch—or possibly even from a president 
beholden to, and expressive of, particular interests.  
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A rational constitutional monarchy, then, while it has and must have less power, 
nevertheless, possesses not less, but greater, authority, significance, and 
importance.  It has a higher legitimacy and a higher right.  Consequently, the 
recognition that subjects can get back from such a monarch (as property holders, 
marriage partners, citizens, and so forth) is more significant and real than the 
recognition that could come from an absolute monarch.   
 
IV.  
It is Hegel’s view that in modern civil society, self-interest, in Adam Smithian 
fashion, leads toward and reinforces the universal and rational,   
 
particular interests should reach their full development and gain recognition of 
their right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and also 
that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest 
of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this 
universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as 
their ultimate end.… The principle of modern states has enormous strength and 
depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain its fulfilment in the 
self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, while at the same time bringing it 




As the universal appears in and through this pursuit of particular interest, Hegel 
says that we see the “shimmering of rationality.”74  The task of the legislature is to 
bring this implicit rationality to full consciousness.75  The distinctive function of the 
legislature is to ensure that members of civil society “participate in … knowledge, 
deliberations, and decisions on matters of universal concern” such that public 
opinion can arrive at “true thoughts and insight with regard to the condition and 
concept of the state and its affairs, thereby enabling it to form more rational 
judgements on the latter.”76    
It is the task of the council of ministers to bring such rationality before the 
monarch.77  Hegel says the monarch can decide one way or the other,  
 
but it is inherent in the way the state is organized that the rational must happen.  
It is organized as an inwardly organic system, wherein particular caprice 
evaporates in the face of universal necessity.  The power of the system is the 
rational, and it is in this that one must trust and not regard the power of the 
contingent as preponderant.78 
 
Hegel wants a weak monarch and a weak legislature so as not to obstruct the 
expression and actualization of this rationality.  It is Hegel’s view that the highest 
civil servants have a deeper and more comprehensive insight, greater skill, and a 
greater ability to do what is best.79  These civil servants, largely of the middle class,80 
are characterized by education, knowledge, and proof of ability checked by 
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examinations.81  What prevents the ministers from becoming too powerful is their 
answerability to the legislature.  They can be questioned on anything.82   
Hegel’s monarch is not anything like an arbitrary and capricious absolute 
monarch.  Hegel’s monarch gives expression to the highest values that through 
historical development have been actualized in the institutions of the modern 
rational state. 83  
We must confront an objective world that is not other, not hostile, not an 
obstacle to reason.  The objective world must be rational, such that subjectively 
rational action meets itself, meets reason, in the world, and thus fits and is 
reinforced.  If right has been actualized, if reason has been realized, if law has been 
institutionalized, that is to say, if the world has been ordered and arranged 
rationally, and if all of this has permeated custom, tradition, and practice, then 
individual subjectivity will not find its world to be an obstacle to its rational action.  
It will not confront it as an obstruction.  It will be a world that will confirm and 
reinforce the subject.  Hegel says, “The state is often represented as held together by 
might, but what in fact holds it together is the fundamental feeling of order 
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